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It may readily be seen that this test leads to difficulty in cases in which one
act or transaction includes several offenses of different degrees. The courts,
however, have generally shown no hesitancy in holding that a prosecution
for one offense bars a subsequent prosecution for all offenses arising from
the same21transaction which are included therein, or in which it may be
included.
The question in the principal case as to whether or not a prosecution on
an affidavit charging the transportation of intoxicating liquor, if carried
to final judgment, would be a bar to a subsequent prosecution for transporting
intoxicating liquor in an automobile was undoubtedly correctly decided,
transporting liquor being an offense included in a charge of transporting
liquor in an automobile. 22 The language used by the court in applying the
test of when a second prosecution would be barred is misleading. "When
the facts necessary to convict on the second prosecution would necessarily
have convicted on the first, a final judgment on the first will be a bar to the
second." As pointed out before, it is not necessary for the prosecution to
go to final judgment in order to jeopardize the accused, but jeopardy attaches
when the jury is impaneled and sworn.
C. L. C.
ConstitutionalLaw-Is a Justice of Peace Court an Impartial Tribunal.This was an appeal from a judgment rendered against appellant upon overruling his exceptions to appellees' return to a writ of habeas corpus. The
writ of habeas corpus was granted and served upon appellee pursuant to
appellant's petition in which he alleged that he was. held by virtue of a commitment issued by appellee Minas, as justice of the peace. The commitment
was founded upon a judgment for fine and costs against appellant in a
criminal proceeding before said justice of the peace. In his petition for
writ of habeas corpus, appellant alleged, among other things, that the judgment and commitment of appellee were illegal and void; urging that appellee,
as justice of peace, was entitled to no pay for his services, unless appellant
was convicted and paid his fine, and that under the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States, such a procedure deprived a defend-i
ant in a criminal case of due process of law to subject his liberty or property
to the judgment of a court, the judge of which had a direct, personal,
pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him. Held, that a judgment and commitment after trial in a criminal proceeding before a justice
of peace was not void as denying due process.'
The Constitution of Indiana provides that: "A competent number of
justices of the peace shall be elected by the voters in each township in the
several counties. They shall continue in office four years, and their powers
and duties shall be prescribed by law." 2 It can readily be seen, therefore,
that the Constitution of Indiana only provides for the office of justice of the
peace, and that the extent of the powers and duties of such office has been
187 Ind. 94, 118 N. E. 567; Nordlinger v. United States (1904), 24 App. D. C. 406,
158, 71 N. E. 842; Commonwealth
70 L. R. A. 227; O'Donnel v. People (1904), 211 Ill.
v. Roby (1832), 29 Mass. 496; Woods v. State (1916), 15 Ala. App. 251, 73 So. 129;
Commonwealth v. Croft (1925), 208 Ky. 220, 270 S. W. 816; Duvall v. State (1924),
111 Ohio St. 657, 146 N. E. 90.
21 State v. Hattabaugh (1879), 66 Ind. 223; State v. Elder (1879), 65 Ind. 282;
State v. Rosenbaum (1899), 23 Ind. App. 236, 55 N. E. 110; State v. Blevins (1902),
134 Ala. 213, 32 So. 637; Sanford v. State (1918), 75 Fla. 393, 78 So. 340; Schroeder
v. United States (1925), 7 F. (2d) 60.
22 Bryant v. State (1933), 186 N. E. 322 (Ind.).
'Harding v. Minas (1934), - Ind. -, 190 N. E. 862.
2 Section 14, Article 7 of the Constitution of Indiana.
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left entirely to legislative decree. Consequently, the Indiana legislature has
provided that the justices of peace should have jurisdiction in criminal cases
co-extensive with their respective counties; such jurisdiction being in some
cases exclusive and in others, concurrent. 3 A further section 4 of the same
act provides what fees justices of the peace may charge and what salaries
certain justices of the peace are to receive. Justices of the peace located in
townships not having a city or cities of or over a specified population are
placed upon a fee basis only.
In the present case, the Indiana Supreme Court was faced with the question whether in a criminal proceeding such a tribunal as the present justice
of the peace court, operating on a basis of fees payable as costs only upon
conviction, 5 is an impartial tribunal under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Supreme
Court of Indiana decided that such a court was an impartial tribunal, and in
so doing seemingly disregarded the better weight of authority and judicial
reasoning.
Due process of law as to legal procedure does not always require a
judicial tribunal,0 but it does require an impartial one. 7 The general rule
is that officers acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity are disqualified
by their interest in the controversy.8 The question, however, often arises
as to what the degree or nature of the interest must be. An exception to
the rule has been made where the interest is so remote, trifling and insignificant that it may fairly be supposed to be incapable of influencing the
conduct of an individual. 9
The cases show that in determining what due process of law is, under
the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment, the Court must look to those settled
usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statutory law
of England before the emigration of our ancestors, which were shown not
to have been unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been
acted on by them after the settlement of this country. 10 In the leading case
of Tumey v. Ohio,11 the Supreme Court of the United States was faced
with the problem of whether there was any usage or practice at common law
by which justices of the peace or.inferior judicial officers were paid fees
on condition that they convicted the defendant, such as to make a trial before
such a tribunal due process. In this case, one Tumey was convicted before
a mayor's court, the presiding officer of which was entitled to retain the
amount of his costs in each case in addition to his salary, but no costs were
to be paid except by the defendant in case of conviction. Chief Justice
Taft, however, after an exhaustive treatment of English and United States
Indiana Statutes (1934), sec. 2084.
Baldwin's Indiana Statutes (1934), sec. 2008.

3 Baldwin's
4

5 Although there is in the act governing justices of the peace no direct provision
as to payment of costs; there is likewise no provision that the state pay such costs.
It is apparent, therefore, that costs can be assessed and paid only upon a conviction, as

an acquitted defendant would not be liable for such costs. And this has been the general

practice throughout Indiana.
6 Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley (1896), 164 U. S. 112; United States v.

Ju Toy (1905), 198 U. S. 253.
7 Moore v. Dempsey (1923), 261 U. S. 86; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (1927),
8th. ed.) 870-873.

s Peace v. Atwood (1816), 13 Mass. 324; Taylor v. Commissioners (1870), 105
Mass. 225; Kentish Artillery v. Gardiner (1886), 15 R. I. 296; Moses v. Julian (1863),
45 N. H. 52; Railroad Company v. Howard (1870), 20 Mich. 18; State v. Crane (1873).
36 N. J. L. 394.
9 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (1927, 8th. ed.) 872-873.
10 Ownbey v. Morgan (1920), 256 U. S. 94; Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land
and Improvement Company (1853), 18 How. 272; Tumey v. Ohio (1926), 273 U. S. 510
L1(1926), 273 U. S. 510.
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history upon the subject of such practices, concluded that, "A system by
which an inferior judge is paid for his service only when he convicts the
defendant has not become so imbedded by custom in the general practice,
either at common law or in this country, that it can be regarded as due process
of law, unless the costs usually imposed are so small that they may be
properly ignored as within the maxim 'de minimus non curat lex'." He
further pointed out that in analogous cases it was very clear that the slightest
pecuniary interest of any officer, judicial or quasi-judicial, in the resolving
of the subject matter which he was to decide rendered the decision voidable. 12
And in deciding that such a practise as followed in the Ohio mayor's court
rendered the court a partial tribunal, the Chief Justice said, "But it certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment and deprives a defendant in a
criminal case of due process of law to subject his liberty or property to
the judgment of a court, the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial,
pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in the case."
The decision in the Tumey case involved only a mayor, but it would seem
that the doctrine of the case should apply as well to justices of the peace and3
all other judges who are circumstanced as was the mayor in that case,'
and the courts of Ohio have so held ;14 although the Supreme Court of Ohio
has taken the position that while the decision applies to justices of the peace,
it had the effect of giving a defendant the privilege of objecting to the
disqualification of the judge and that if this was not done, the qualification
was waived and the defendant had due process of law as to procedure in
spite of the fact that the tribunal was not impartial. This latter interpretation is open to serious question, and the United States District Court, in
Ex parte Baer, 15 has taken the opposite position. The Supreme Court of
Oklahoma, in a recent decision, 16 citing the Tumey case as an authority, has
asserted that where the disqualification of a judge is considered a matter of
public policy, a waiver will not be allowed; and that the judge is not authorized to sit in a case, even with the consent of the parties, where he has a
direct interest, such as a financial interest, in the judgment to be rendered.
The Indiana Supreme Court in the principal case, relied completely upon
two earlier Indiana cases for its decision. The latest of these, Cole v.
Wherly,' 7 also relied altogether on the earlier, State v. Schelton,' s the
leading case in this state. It is necessary, therefore, to examine this case
carefully in an effort to determine whether the reasoning justifies the result.
The Indiana Supreme Court in the Schelton case decided that there were
certain essential differences in the Indiana statute and practice which rendered
the Tumey case inapplicable, thereby making a trial before a justice of the
peace court due process. The court first pointed out that if the defendant
entertained fears that the justice of peace would be influenced to convict in
order to recover his fee, defendant had a right to call for a jury; whereas
under the Ohio statute, he had no such right. It is difficult, however, to
understand how such a privilege, even if exercised, would protect the defendant from a partial tribunal. The justice, like any other judge, would still
be the presiding officer of the court, with the same powers to instruct the
12Bonham's Case (1610), 2 Brownl. 255; Hawkins, 2 Pleas of the Crown.

(1928) 3 Ind.
'3Willis, Are Justice of the Peace Courts Impartial Tribunals?
L. J. 654. A very clear treatment of the applicability of Tumey v. Ohio to the Indiana
situation, by an outstanding scholar.
14 Foster v. State of Ohio (1927), 26 N. P. (N. S.) 476; In Re Canfield and
Duckett (1927), 27 N. P. (N. S.) 465.
5 (1927), 20 Fed. (2nd.) 912.
16 State ex rel. Dabney v. Ledbetter (1932), 9 Pac. (2nd) 728 (Okla.).
17 Cole v. Wherley (1934), 18 State v. Schelton (1933), -

Ind.

Ind.

-,
-,

190 N. E. 56.

186 N. E. 772.

RECENT CASE NOTES

jury, decide on admissability of evidence, and rule on motions. This is
certainly not due process in any sense of the phrase.
The Supreme Court asserted as a second distinction that, under the
19
statute, the defendant is entitled to a change of venue from the justice.
This, however, is an empty gesture, as the defendant can get only a change
of venue to another township and another justice, or to a special justice,
who shall be entitled to the same fees as the regular justice. Such a privilege,
therefore, is of little value in supplying the defendant with an impartial
tribunal. He will be subjected to the same prejudice wherever and by
whomever he is tried.
The court points out as a third distinction that the defendant, if convicted
by either justice or jury, had the right to appeal to the circuit court and
there try his case de novo either before judge or jury; while under the
Ohio statute, the defendant's right to appeal was considerably limited. There
is more merit to this distinction than any other asserted by the court; neveriheless, the complete effect of such procedure is to force a defendant to try
his case twice to get justice at the hands of a wholly impartial tribunal.
This is a severe handicap upon the defendant who has neither the necessary
time nor money with which to perfect the appeal and retrial of his case.
Surely a satisfactory system of justice cannot sanction the placing of such
a burden on the defendant.
The Indiana Supreme Court further urges that since the fees of the
justice are small, they could properly be ignored as within the maxim "de
minimis non curat lex." It may readily be admitted that the fees are small.
But at the same time, it should not be forgotten that in most of the townships
throughout the state these same fees are the only remuneration the justice
of the peace receives. He makes his living that way; and his interest in
rceiving these fees will not be diminished because they are not large. The
courts of other states have held that where the judge has a direct pecuniary
interest in the outcome of the case before him he is disqualified,20 and the
degree of interest is immaterial ;21 it need not be large, 22 but will disbar him
from sitting in the cause no matter how small or trifling it may be. 23
As an additional argument in favor of the justice of the peace courts,
the Indiana Supreme Court says, "The office of justice of the peace has come
down to us through the ages and has often been designated as the 'poor
man's court.' It has a place in our system of courts-the whole system
should not be condemned and uprooted from our judicial system." This is
indeed a noble sentiment, but it is apparently based on the false assumption
that justice of the peace courts are a fundamental part of the common law
courts. In the early beginnings of the Anglo-Americai system of jurisprudence, justices of the peace were mere conservators of the peace, and not
judges at all; and their gradual evolution into inferior judges was due largely
to the exigencies of the times, rather than any inherent worth or logical
development. 24 As already pointed out, Chief Justice Taft, in the Tumey
case, came to the conclusion that a system whereby an inferior judge was
if
20

Baldwin's Indiana Statutes (1934), sec. 1896. 1897. 1898.

McConnell v. Goodwin (1914), 189 Ala. 390, 66 So. 675; Clyma v. Kennedy

(1894), 64 Conn. 310, 29 Atl. 539; Foreman v. Hunter (1882), 59 Iowa 550, 13 N. W.
659; Northhampton v. Smith (1846), 11 Metc. 390.
21 Lindsay-Strathmore In. Dist. v. Tulare County Super. Court (1920), 182 Cal.
315, 187 Pac. 1056; Findley v. Smith (1896), 42 W. Va. 299. 26 S. E. 370.
22 People v. Whitridge (1911), 144 App. Div. 493, 129 N. Y. S. 300.
23 In Re Honolulu Cons. Oil Co. (1917), 243 Fed. 348, 156 C. C. A. 128; MacMillan
v. Spencer (1900). 28 Colo. 80, 62 Pac. 849; United States National Bank v. Guthrie
National Bank (1897), 6 Okla. 163, 51 Pac. 119.
24 Willis, Introduction to Anglo-American Law (1931) 113.
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paid for his services only on conviction had no basis in historical or judicial
precedent so as to warrant it to be due process of law; for even after the
justices of the peace became a minor part of the English system of courts,
there was no toleration of the dependency of the justice upon a conviction
for his fees.2 5 It is hard to see how these conclusions can be ignored or
rebutted.
R. S. O.

Workmen's Compensation-Injury Arising Out of and in the Course of
the Employment-Shooting of Non-Union Miner by Picket During Strike.Union miners employed by appellee went out on strike on April 1, 1932,
and appellee employed appellant and other nonunion miners to work in the
mine. On the day of the injury, long before the usual quitting time, appellant
and the other workers were ordered to stop working by the foreman. They
were ordered to the top where they found the mine surrounded by pickets.
Here the mine guards and bosses passed out rifles, ammunition, and dynamite
and told them to protect the mine property in the event the pickets entered
upon the mine property. They were also ordered to stay at the mine, under
cover, until the sheriff arrived to escort them to their homes. While so
waiting in the tipple and after several hours, appellant was shot in the arm
by one of the pickets. Held, appellant's injury, as a matter of law, arose
"in the course of and out of his employment."'
The question of Workmen's Compensation as respects injuries suffered
by employees due to labor disorders and industrial strife is a unique one
in spite of its seemingly possible prevalence. Dudine, J. far from overstated
the status of the law on this problem when he said, "It is a new question for
this court." In fact it would have been a new one for most courts, and
the law reviews and journals seem consequently to be quite devoid of notes
or articles precisely in point. Of course, technically, a solution may be
found in some interpretation of the clause "accident arising but of and in
the course of the employment," '2 a clause, which of necessity is one that may
include everything, anything, or almost nothing. But it is not the purpose
of this note to deal with the many views already expounded on such interpretation. 3 Suffice to state, that if it is true, as has often been said, that the
beauty of the law lies in its uncertainty, there is little danger df Workmen's
Compensation litigation marring that attribute when we find what is termed
a rough expression of the general principles 4 to be, "the statute imposing
liability embraces all injuries that arise out of and occur while the workman
injured is doing what a man under like facts and circumstances, engaged
in like employment may reasonably do, in the conduct or projection of such
work for the employer or in the promotion or safeguarding of such business,
or for the protection of the men and properties while used or engaged for
the purposes of the master's business." 5
In other words, the facts and circumstances of each case should govern
that case, and the facts and circumstances of the principal case being an
altogether new situation to an Indiana court, the decision was unhampered
2

5 Tumey v. Ohio (1926), 273 U. S. 510.
1 Bedwell v. Dixie Bee Coal Corp. (1934), 192 N. E. 723 (Ind.).
2 Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act, Acts 1917, p. 673.

8 R. A. Brown, "Arising out of and In The Course of the Employment" (1931-32),
7 Wis. L. R. 15 and 67; (1932-33), 8 Wis. L. R. 134 and 217; Heilbron, Accident "in
Course of Employment," (1930), 18 Cal. L. R. 551.
4 Harper, Law of Torts (1933), sec. 212.
5 Ex parte Majestic Coal Co. (1927), 208 Ala. 86, 93 So. 728.

